Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
In dramatic fashion, Israel had won outnumbered. The IDF, with 25,000 men, 1,000 tanks, and 250 combat aircraft, had decimated an Arab coalition of 300,000 troops, close to 2,000 tanks, and over 500 fighters and bombers…. Israeli losses in this lightning campaign were 983 killed, 4,517 wounded, and fifteen missing, a relatively small figure when compared to the over 10,000 Egyptian casualties. Jordan, for reluctantly participating in the Arab cause, lost 80 percent of its armor and suffered 700 killed and 6,000 wounded and missing (Gawrych: 3).
Israeli Lessons Learned from '67 War
After the 1967 War, Israel took away three lessons that it believed were the key to its success: perception of superior intelligence, technologically superior air power, and ability to conduct rapid armored maneuver. 
Israel before the 1973 War
Arabs prepared for the worst by greatly overestimating the IDF response. Conversely, the IDF's success in 1967 led it to grossly underestimate its Arab enemy's will and ability to fight. IDF leadership was convinced of its superiority over the Arab coalition and convinced that the Arabs knew they were inferior as well (Herzog: 228 Arab attack (Dupuy: 408) .
By the start of the 1973 War, IDF intelligence had failed to warn of the Arab attack, leading to the significant loss of initiative that was the bedrock of the IAF war plans.
As a result, the IAF was denied air superiority by Egyptian air defenses and proved sub- without it, Israel learned that its armor became vulnerable due to its lack of ground intelligence and adequate infantry support.
U.S. Military Experience 1991-2002

Gulf War (Decisive Tactical Victory)
Like the IDF winning victory over the Arabs in 1967, the 1991 U.S.-led coalition achieved a dramatic and decisive tactical victory over the Iraqi forces in a 100-hour ground campaign that followed a 100-day air campaign.
The Iraqis lost 3,847 of their 4,280 tanks, over half their 2,880 armored personnel carriers and nearly all their 3,100 artillery pieces. Only five to seven of their forty-three combat divisions remained capable of offensive operations. In the days after the cease-fire the busiest soldiers were those engaged in the monumental task of counting and caring for 60,000 [Iraqi] prisoners. And these surprising results came at the cost of 148 Americans killed in action. In the theatre of operations, [the coalition] had won the fastest and most complete victory in military history (Schubert and Krause: 201) .
United States Lessons Learned from 1991 Gulf War
In its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) identified five general lessons: (1) the importance of Presidential leadership in setting clear goals, providing a sense of purpose, and rallying domestic and foreign support to achieve those goals; (2) the edge provided by high-tech weapons coupled with effective doctrine; (3) the quality of the personnel from top to bottom; (4) the importance of sound planning, forward-positioned forces, and strategic lift; and (5) the long lead time needed to deploy. Perhaps more significantly, the report strongly emphasized the significant time required to assemble the people and systems that had won the victory (U.S., Conduct: xviii). The time required to develop leaders, equipment, and doctrine makes it essential that the U.S. military make sound decisions as it tries to "transform" itself in the post-Gulf War and post-Cold War world. Mistakes and bad decisions today hold the potential for long-term impact on future leaders and systems.
U.S. Transformation Efforts Since 1991
As the United States has moved away from the Cold War, it has struggled to redefine its military doctrine in order to "transform" itself for the challenges of the new millennium and simultaneously achieve a "peace dividend." As a result, the U.S. military has simultaneously cut over 40 percent of its force structure even as it has increased operational tempo by 300 percent while simultaneously attempting to mold itself to face future undefined threats (U.S., QDR: 58). In In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the military establishment basked in its success. The impact of that triumph has clearly colored evolving military doctrine.
Unfortunately, "[V]ictory against such an enemy, gratifying as it was, did not constitute a definitive test of any theory or doctrine," but was nevertheless immediately seized upon by all the Services to justify expanded budgets and to justify their significance (Schubert and Krause: 235) . While one can argue the specifics of any training, doctrine, or procurement decision, there is a clear emphasis in today's military on high-tech solutions, like technical intelligence collectors, at the cost of low-tech human intelligence capabilities (HUMINT) as well as heavy reliance on Global Positioning System (GPS) and digitized command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) to provide the information dominance to offset reduced forces. A focus on fewer, air-delivered precision systems over less sophisticated "mass" systems and a desire to achieve strategic and tactical movement/maneuver capability by acquiring lighter and faster ground systems are similarly highlighted. While none of these areas of current focus are inherently wrong, they each provide the potential for the U.S. military to create its own vulnerabilities a la the post-1967 Israelis. Like Sadat, who in 1973 was more focused on a diplomatic and informational victory than a military one, a clever enemy of the United States may find the seams today created by an unbalanced U.S. transformation that has been molded by the nation's own arrogance, and successfully exploit them.
Potential U.S. "Transformation" Errors
1. Information Superiority (Supremacy of Intelligence). Defined as "the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an interrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same" (U.S., JV 2020: 8), this element requires a high reliance on technology, which can be both a boon and a crutch as demonstrated by the effects of computer viruses on military network systems. While all these technologies give the United States great capability to fight like-minded adversaries, they also make it vulnerable to focused asymmetric attack. While U.S. ground forces have lost much of their ability to navigate without GPS and naval and air forces similarly have become overly reliant on GPS availability, simple off-the-shelf local jamming capability could be a simple but dramatically effective means for the next adversary to degrade U.S.
operations.
Precision Engagement (Unmatched Air Power). This element requires inter-
linking sensors and systems to identify targets and engage, if necessary, to achieve the desired effects, including the use of both kinetic and nonkinetic weapons (U.S., JV 2020:
2). Again, the strong reliance on technology has led to some potentially dangerous assumptions. For example, with the decreased size and weight of some systems, there is now a greater ability to get some vulnerable systems into harm's way. That leads to the belief that precision technology makes up for the sometimes-needed benefits of quantity to offset unexpected enemy asymmetric success. In addition, on many occasions systems that were designed to defeat the latest in technological advances have been defeated by enemies using rudimentary weapons and tactics. Another unintended consequence of U.S. "precision" is the perception that the inevitable collateral damage must be deliberate since U.S. weapons are so inherently accurate. forces initially attempted to apply solely one-dimensional air power solutions to achieve objectives. While the vastly superior U.S. Air Forces have been critical to success, providing as-advertised Dominant Maneuver, in every case it required multidimensional (airsea-ground) application of force to achieve the desired outcomes. Properly (not necessarily equally) balanced application of joint force capability is more effective than any one-dimensional approach. Such a balanced approach, however, may be contradicted by the political reality of desired low casualty rates. Conducting a one-dimensional, aircentric war may even lead to the misperception of a low U.S. commitment by allies or even the enemy. One can even win the air campaign and lose the informational war.
Similarly, the impact of strategic attack may be negated when fighting nonstate or nonindustrialized, dispersed, infantry-type enemy. In addition, the desire to be more strategically mobile is sound and may require some trade-offs between lethality, protection and mobility. Nevertheless, this does not mean lighter is inherently better for all contingen-cies. The U.S. Army in its rush for relevance has cut 25 percent of its artillery and armor capability in its dwindling number of divisions based on the unproven premise that superior information dominance will offset such a decrease in lethality, firepower, and tactical mobility. As the Israelis learned, in combat quantity has a quality all its own.
United States in 2002
As forces in a phased, sequential, and very conventional campaign (Schmitt: 1). The assumption is that the even better technology the nation has today will provide for a rapid, decisive victory.
As a result of the 1967 War, Israel gained a reputation as a regional superpower with unmatched military capability. Its success also helped it earn a reputation as a "bully" that used its power to dictate unacceptable conditions to its neighbors. Similarly, the United States after the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union has certainly gained a "global bully" reputation among both enemies and erstwhile friends. 
Conclusion
While there are many parallels between the Israeli 1967-1973 experience and the U.S. experiences after 1991, the final impact of decisive victory on future U.S. operations may not be known until after a "Gulf War II." U.S. military transformation is a deliberate attempt to create a mindset of innovation and adaptation. It focuses not on fighting the last war but on vigorously trying to anticipate the demands of future conflicts to develop capabilities, technologies, doctrine, and organizations that can be decisive in those conflicts. While transformation is not a "magic bullet" that will guarantee bloodless victory, it does appear to be a genuine effort by the politico-military establishment to avoid the potential pitfalls of a decisive victory such as those that plagued Israel in the 1973 ArabIsraeli War.
